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 1 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE NATURE OF MORALITY: 
THE ABOLITION OF MAN, C.S. LEWIS 
Logos I-Philosophy 
Lucie Steiner 
 
In C.S. Lewis’ “The Abolition of Man,” it is proposed that objective value1 exists in 
the Tao and, the ability of people to discover these common moral ‘truths’ is proof of their 
existence. In this essay, I will argue that Lewis’ theory of moral objectivity holds more weight 
than moral sentimentalism, because once we object to the existence of objectivity, and morality 
becomes subjective, the need to seek out an ethical existence becomes self-invalidating since 
there is no common objective amongst humanity. I propose that David Hume’s theory of moral 
sentimentalism assumes that ultimately, regardless of motivation, what is deemed ethical 
behaviour is still driven by common recognition of societal goals, or utility, which become 
objective values. Even if one cannot accept what Lewis calls the Tao, Hume is also an example 
of how it is also ethically more productive for society to believe in objective values because 
they lead to utility and virtuous action.  
Several clarifications need to be made for the purposes of this essay. Firstly, ethics 
concerns itself with morality, and how we judge a thing to be good or bad based on the concept 
of living a ‘good’ life2. Ethics is also about reflection3, and the nature of ethics denotes how 
we reach conclusions about moral action; it assumes we are all “rational [human] beings”4 that 
acknowledge the notion of a moral ‘right’ and ‘wrong’5. Lewis proposes that only through 
uniting Sentiment, Emotion and Reason will ‘Man’ ever become ethical6, enabling them to live 
according to the Tao. With these descriptors, the moral realism7 of Lewis’ ‘Man’ can be 
                                                     
1 Several phrases in the text denote the concept of morality, e.g. moral law, values, moral truth and objective 
value, and will be used interchangeably in this essay.  
2 Raymond A. Younis, “What is ethics?” in An Introduction to Philosophy and Theology within Catholic Liberal 
Education, ed. Angus Brook (North Ryde: McGraw Hill, 2015), 114-116. 
3 Younis, “What is ethics?” 114. 
4 Younis, 111. 
5 Whether or not these are true, or what we consider to be right and wrong is the same, is beyond the scope of 
this essay. 
6 The head (reason) rules the belly (emotion/appetite) though the chest (stable sentiments, or indeed the soul of a 
man and the seat of his morality). These three traits unite to make his moral ‘Man.’ See C.S Lewis, The 
Abolition of Man (London: Fount Paperbacks, 1999), 15. 
7 Dejan Simkovic, “Ethics, moral phenomology and moral experience,” in An Introduction to Philosophy and 
Theology within Catholic Liberal Education, ed. Angus Brook (North Ryde: McGraw Hill, 2015), 166. 
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contrasted with the sentimentalism8 and moral internalism9 of Hume, who posits that morality 
is a “product of human nature,”10 related to our experience of the world and forms a “common 
point of view”11; we are ultimately still motivated by internal forces and not a collective 
consciousness of what is moral. In both views, men admit ‘Reason’ is be united with a feeling-
based quality12, in order to reach a conclusion about how we perceive morality is constructed.  
Lewis argues that at the core of humanity, there are identifiable, objective values in 
place that facilitate our knowledge of ethics13, and being subjective means there is no definition 
of moral law, therefore it cannot exist as anything other than objective. In defending Lewis, I 
must first try to defend the Tao. This “doctrine”14 outlines concepts of right and wrong 
throughout antiquity that are the “basic assumptions” of “moral rules”15. In reading the Tao, it 
is hard not to recognise that there are common values which still remain relevant in society 
today16, across different countries, religions and cultures17. What has been discovered is 
common to different societies in humanity, and thus the mutual recognition of these values 
makes them objective. 
The main point I wish to highlight in Lewis’ proposal is that denial of objective value 
is self-contradictory, and therefore there is no room for subjectivity because you cannot 
construct a rejection of something within the framework of it18. If one promotes a subjective 
moral order, then they are also acknowledging the possibility of an objective one; if one says 
                                                     
8 “David Hume,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, last revised May 21, 2014, 
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/hume/#Mor.; Michael Slote, “Moral Sentimentalism,” Ethical Theory and 
Moral Practice 7, no. 1 (March 2004): 3-14. http://jstor.org/stable/27504292. 
9 See Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, “Moral Internalism and Moral Cognitivism in Hume’s Metaethics,” Synthese 152, 
no. 3 (October 2006): 353-4, http://jstor.org/stable/27653401; and Paul Sagar, “Mind the Gap: Bernard Williams 
and David Hume on Living an Ethical Life,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11, no. 5 (2014): 615-6, 620, 624, 
https://doi.org/10.1163/17455243-4681019.  
10 “David Hume,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
11 “David Hume,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
12 Lewis refers to emotions and impulse, and Hume refers to sympathy and sentiment.  
13 Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 11-12.  
14 Lewis, 11. 
15 P.H. Nowell-Smith, Ethics (London: Penguin, 1959), 14. 
16 For example, the modern definition of murder in terms of killing another human being is described as a 
‘crime’ or ‘unlawful’, implying it is a ‘bad’ action. It is referenced in the first Law of General Beneficience 
(Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 51); see https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/murder; 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/murder. 
17 Many of the laws in the Tao (Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 51-63) also resemble tenets found in religious 
texts, for example the Ten Commandments of Judaism and Christianity (see 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/catechism/command.htm; 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-ten-commandments) correspond to the Law of General Beneficience, 
Duties to Parents, Elders, Ancestors, and the Law of Justice (see Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 52, 56, 58). 
18 “If it is rejected, all value is rejected…There has never been, and never will be, a radically new judgement of 
value in the history of the world.” Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 27.  
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that values are subjective, then there would be no definition of values at all19, and ‘value’ ceases 
to exist20. His defence of the objectivity of moral truth lies in the notion that only those that 
accept the Tao understand it, and those on the outside have no real concept of it21. This makes 
them unreasonable, and by the very nature of being a ‘Man’, you must have Reason, achieved 
through mediating your beliefs and emotions, in order to accept the Tao. It stands that being 
unreasonable is your only shortcoming, and the question is not about the shortcomings of the 
Tao. Lewis concludes that we must accept objective moral truth on this basis, because to 
question it would be akin to “creating a new sun”22; put simply, by recognising something you 
are accepting its existence, and it is not the moral laws that need defending; it is your rejection 
of them. In essence, it would be like rejecting whether or not something is a table; we can 
theorise about what it might be, but in the end, the very discourse about it proves that it must 
exist, otherwise there would be no need to even acknowledge it. 
Lewis further proposes that once we accept the Tao, to be ethical we must fuse Appetite 
and Reason into stable Sentiment, because in lacking one or two of these qualities one becomes 
“de-humanized” and ‘Man’ is abolished.23 An excess of one will lead to imbalance, and if 
virtue is to be sought, a middle path must be followed; this is the ‘chest’ Lewis speaks of. Hume 
suggests that we are driven by emotion over reason, and eventually patterns and society give 
way to virtuous action24. However, some of Hume’s premises are not dissimilar from Lewis’ 
view of how virtuous patterns of behaviour give rise to the recognition of general moral truths. 
What Hume describes as “passion”25 Lewis might relate to Appetite or Emotion, which 
to him need to harmonise with Reason in order to make one an ethical being. Hume describes 
that living ethically does not require an external basis and the only justifications for our actions 
are internally derived26, shattering the notion that there could be a universally recognised 
doctrine of moral truths. Hume argues that your beliefs and desires, moulded by your 
experience of the world, force you to pursue what is self-approbating27. However, this essay’s 
focus is on the existence of objective values, therefore it does not matter where moral behaviour 
                                                     
19 “Nothing is actually right or wrong, according to the subjectivist, if there are no people, or no personal 
opinions about matters of fact.” See Russ Schafer-Landau, Moral Realism: A Defence (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 2003), 14, http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199259755.001.0001. 
20 Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 32. 
21 Lewis, 27-30, 46. 
22 Lewis, 27. 
23 Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 45. 
24 Sagar, “Mind the Gap,” 619-620. 
25 Those being desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair and security. See Radcliffe, “Moral Internalism,” 
355. 
26 Sagar, “Mind the Gap,” 620-624.  
27 Radcliffe, “Moral Internalism,” 353-368. 
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comes from, because this does not preclude the existence of moral truths. Taking Hume’s 
position, one could even argue that sentiments inevitably evolve to recognise what Lewis has 
delineated as the Tao, because once these conclusions exist they prove the objectivity of moral 
truths. 
This subjective view of ethics is similar to the idea that we should not privilege a 
universal idea of morality because it would be comparing different cultures to each other28, and 
taking a stand on which have better or worse rules about how to live a good life. To Lewis, 
believing in different things is not the issue, but rather how we recognise these beliefs as 
appropriate or inappropriate29. If everything is relative and subjective, his view of ethics falls 
apart because it reduces the Tao to opinions and not ‘truths’. Hume conjectures that our view 
of appropriate and inappropriate feelings is measured by the idea of sympathy and moral 
sentiments30. Everything we feel as humans is good or bad, approving or disapproving, is 
related to our experience of the world and a “general point of view”31 where we use sympathy 
to gather collective notions of character to arrive at moral conclusions for ourselves32. His view 
claims that we often see moral behaviour in terms of utility33, but virtuousness is only a product 
of the actions we perform for self-approval34. Therefore, the moral value is discoverable by 
society because certain actions tend to bring utility and afford us individual satisfaction, and 
we repeat these actions because they give the best outcomes. This does not mean that moral 
truth is invented by convention, but recognises that there is some intuitiveness35 that what is 
ethically best for the individual seems to also benefit society. Since society is made up of 
individuals, we can consider that there must be some common link between us or a priori 
knowledge of what is morally right driving us towards virtuous action, which evidences the 
objectivity of moral truth. Therefore, these must be self-evident, which makes them objective.36 
Furthermore, even if morality is self-driven, because humans are often connected to 
societies everything exists in relation to the self. Even if society does not play a major role in 
our ethical decision-making, it is still reflective of it, and eventually good and bad behaviour 
will define itself within this framework and recognise certain objective truths. Hume 
                                                     
28 James Rachels, Elements of Moral Philosophy (New York: McGraw Hill, 1986), 16. 
29 Lewis, The Abolition of Man, 10. 
30 “David Hume,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
31 “David Hume,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
32 “David Hume,” Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. 
33 Sagar, “Mind the Gap,” 625. 
34 Rachel Cohon, “Hume’s Moral Sentiments as Motives,” Hume Studies 36, no. 2 (2010): 196, 
https://doi.org/10.1353/hms.2010.0024. 
35 Schafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 248-251. 
36 See Schafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 248-267. 
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illuminates the internal aspect of ethical decision-making, but still assumes some generalised 
aspect of right and wrong with the perception that what is good for society is good for the 
individual37. In this way we can see the merit in Lewis’ argument, because we may be able to 
recognise some moral ‘truths’ if we look closely enough at the attitudes that have been retained 
in humanity. The very notion of a general point of view also strongly implies we can 
universalise to some degree what people consider to be virtuous, such as the notion of the Tao 
implies the universal discovery of moral truths. However, moral sentimentalism raises an 
interesting point about whether we can consider ourselves living ethical lives if our motivations 
are not virtuous. Reducing morality to motivation is not convincing enough38 to say that ethics 
are subjective because humans are subjective beings, because it eventually gives rise to general 
or common notions of good in society, which is what Lewis’ realises in the Tao.   
If we pursue the idea of subjectivity, the arguments surrounding what makes an ethical 
life become futile because there is no agreed-upon definition of it, where nobody is invalidated 
but nobody is right. In recognising the relevance of the Tao and the self-contradictory 
complexity of subjectivity, C.S. Lewis’ objective stance on ethics makes more sense than the 
moral sentimentalism of David Hume, because if we cannot ultimately agree on what 
constitutes moral action, there is no need for us to argue the existence of moral law.  
  
                                                     
37 Sagar, “Mind the Gap,” 625; and Catherine Wilson, “Moral Truth: Observational or Theoretical?” The 
Aristotelian Society 111, no. 1 (April 2011): 106, https://doi-org.ipacez.nd.edu.au/10.1111/j.1467-
9264.2011.00300.x.  
38 Schafer-Landau, Moral Realism, 191-214. 
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